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Why Nudges Matter: A Reply to Goodwin 
Politics 33, no. 1 (2013): 28-36 
 
Abstract 
 
This article argues that, contrary to Goodwin’s recent arguments, nudges are compatible 
with the coalition government’s stated aspiration to further self-empowerment. This is 
because, despite its libertarian roots, nudging is compatible with the promotion of 
personal autonomy and thus can be used to promote self-empowerment in a non-
paternalistic fashion. Further, I argue that nudging may play a valid role in tackling large-
scale social problems in tandem with other traditional policy measures. Consequently, 
Goodwin is wrong to reject choice architecture for these reasons. 
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Introduction 
In a recent article in these pages, Tom Goodwin (2012) proposes three reasons why we 
might reject the libertarian paternalism proposed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in 
their book Nudge (2008). He argues that the use of ‘nudges’ ought to be rejected as their 
use would contravene the stated current UK government’s aspirations to promote 
empowerment, freedom and fairness. What is more, Goodwin insists that even if this were 
not the case, nudging is not an efficacious way of solving society’s big problems. To 
support his claims Goodwin posits that: (a) the concept of freedom that choice architects 
reference is overly narrow and is thus poorly equipped to empower citizens; (b) nudging 
may be paternalistic, and to the extent that it is we should be worried; and (c) nudging 
may be ineffective as a strategy to tackle some of society’s major ills. He concludes that 
deliberative approaches to democracy may be a better avenue for empowering citizens 
and strengthening society, and he invites further discussion and investigation into some 
of the topics he raises. 
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In this article I take up his challenge and respond to three points. The first concerns the 
role the concept of freedom plays in nudging and how it affects nudging’s potential for 
empowerment. I argue that Goodwin misunderstands a key feature of nudging and thus 
underestimates its capacity for empowerment. My second point of reply relates to the 
paternalistic tendency of nudging. I argue that Goodwin has an overly simplistic view of 
the relationship between paternalism, manipulation and autonomy, and thus mistakenly 
condemns cases of non-paternalistic interference as morally problematic. Finally I 
conclude that Goodwin is correct in his belief that nudges are not always effective at 
changing either deeply ingrained behaviour or large-scale behaviour patterns. However, 
the reasons he provides are mistaken, arising from his failure to grasp a more crucial 
problem regarding the effectiveness of nudging. I argue that a greater understanding of 
the construction of social and moral norms will aid policymakers in tackling the larger 
problems facing modern society, and I briefly sketch the small role that nudges can play 
in designing such policies. 
 
1. Libertarianism, Freedom and Empowerment 
 
One of Goodwin’s main contentions is that the claim that nudges preserve freedom 
(because they preserve or improve choice) is a hollow claim due to the narrow definition 
of freedom used by libertarians. Because libertarians tend to be interested in negative 
freedom, to employ Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) famous labels (or freedom from obstacles to or 
external restrictions on our actions), they are poorly equipped to recognise other 
potential barriers to our liberty. Goodwin argues that alongside these traditional 
restrictions on freedom, the process of self-realisation and overcoming internal obstacles 
to action (e.g. addictions, phobias, aversion and prejudices) may also be important. Such 
a view is commonly termed a positive conception of liberty, and Goodwin believes that 
the inability of nudging to consider or accommodate this range of important factors 
restricts its ability to foster a suitably thick notion of empowerment. We may have 
grounds for questioning the accuracy of Berlin’s account (Swift, 2006, pp. 51–90), but 
aside from this Goodwin’s point is largely correct. We have good reason to believe that 
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the aspects involved in a positive conception of liberty will help foster self-
empowerment. However, it is not obvious that Goodwin’s claim applies to Thaler and 
Sunstein’s project.  
 
It is not clear to what extent Thaler and Sunstein’s view is exclusively concerned with a 
negative conception of freedom. If, as Goodwin appears to believe, nudges were simply 
designed to protect choices by removing external obstacles to us making those choices, 
then nudges would be designed to maximise the number of options that the individual 
faces. Crucially this process would be silent about the type or quality of the options 
available; it would merely focus on the quantity of options. Why might this be important? 
Consider a situation where you face an option set consisting of 15 different flavours of ice 
cream and you are asked whether you would prefer the addition of yet another flavour 
rather than a different form of dessert. The difference between the quantity and quality 
of choice becomes clear in this simple example. The commonly held intuition is that the 
16th flavour of ice cream is less valuable than the different form of dessert. This intuition 
is relevant to Goodwin’s concern because Thaler and Sunstein are not silent on the 
content of the choice architecture that they recommend. The authors argue that it is 
legitimate for choice architects to try to ‘influence choices in a way that will make 
choosers better off, as judged by themselves’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, pp. 5–6, 
emphasis in original). Combined with low opt-out costs (the libertarian requirement of 
nudging), it appears that nudging is designed to further an individual’s ability to act as 
they themselves would like, or certainly in ways that they would not disagree with. It is 
these characteristics that distinguish nudging from other common (non-)regulatory or 
(non-)fiscal interventions designed to affect individual choice. Nudges are intended to 
allow individuals to overcome the various biases and blunders (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008, pp. 19–41) that affect our everyday behaviour in order to lead an authentic life. 
Further, Thaler and Sunstein explicitly consider the ways in which various nudges may 
help us resist temptations (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, pp. 43–56). Biases, blunders and 
temptations are a core concern of positive conceptions of liberty because they can 
prevent authentic decision-making. Consequently in such cases, Goodwin’s claim misses 
its mark. 
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The difficulty facing proponents of nudging (and presumably one of the motivating 
concerns behind Goodwin’s argument) is that this approach works more effectively in 
situations where the individual struggles to understand the situation (and thus may 
require prompting through complex decisions that require lots of technical knowledge or 
rely on probability judgements that the individual feels poorly equipped to make). In 
these situations it may be unclear what the individual’s preferred judgement might be, 
given that the subject of the nudge may struggle to consider the potential impact of their 
choices. Thaler and Sunstein are the first to admit that ‘people are most likely to need 
nudges for decisions that are difficult, complex, and infrequent, and when they have poor 
feedback and few opportunities for learning’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 247). 
Situations where nudging might be most effective then turn out to be situations where it 
is most difficult for the subject of the nudge (the nudgee) to consider whether the 
intervention has benefited them as they themselves would like. Thaler and Sunstein 
recognise this, and this worry motivates their call for nudges to be subject to rigorous 
monitoring and a drive for transparency, and ... to have an obvious opt-out option 
available. With this ‘safety net’ in place, the proponents of nudging hope that some of the 
intuitions behind Goodwin’s first worry will be calmed. 
 
It is important to note that the solution to the problem of empowerment lies in the choice 
architect’s ability to track either the nudgee’s own wishes or their rational wants (those 
things that it would be irrational to deny, e.g. healthier living, a better work–life balance, 
more information regarding complex decisions, etc). If this is the case, then the important 
question is how nudges relate to the personal autonomy of the nudgee. If decision-making 
scenarios can be designed to protect authentic choices – those that the nudgee would 
want to make – then they are at least consistent with empowerment. And to the extent 
that they allow the individual to pursue their authentic goals, helping them to overcome 
various cognitive biases and other sources of weakness of will, then they may indeed 
promote self-empowerment. Thus the answer to Goodwin’s first worry will hinge on how 
libertarians relate to paternalism and personal autonomy. For nudges to be useful in 
pursuing the UK government’s plans for empowering citizens, then the libertarian 
foundations of nudging (how the concept of freedom is interpreted and informs the 
concept) must be compatible with the concept of personal autonomy (a concept central 
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to the idea of self-empowerment as Goodwin defines it). It is to this relationship that I 
now turn. 
 
2. Libertarianism and Autonomy 
 
Personal autonomy is a strongly contested concept in moral and political thought. Both 
its content (Taylor, 2005) and the role that it should play in politics (Christman and 
Anderson, 2005) are hotly debated. It suffices for the purpose of this short response to 
claim that personal autonomy is based around the individual’s capacity for self-control, 
reflective authenticity (Dworkin, 1988, pp. 3–33) and their independence from coercive 
or manipulative influences (Raz, 1986, pp. 369–429). Various claims have been made 
regarding both autonomy’s intrinsic value (Hurka, 1987; Wall, 1998, pp. 127–204) and 
instrumental value in promoting the wellbeing of citizens (Raz, 1986, pp. 369–429; Wall, 
1998, pp. 127–204). For our purposes it appears clear that furthering an individual’s self-
control and ability to reflect authentically on their life plans, free from various 
manipulative or coercive pressures, will play a core part of policies designed to increase 
self-empowerment.  
 
Goodwin correctly identifies that libertarians have a poor history of taking into account 
the concerns of positive liberty. Part of this difficulty comes from the complex conceptual 
relationship between freedom and autonomy (Colburn, 2010, pp. 70–77). But specifically 
this problem arises because libertarians deny many of the claims made by those who 
argue for the value of personal autonomy, choosing to value negative liberty instead. 
Indeed we may have reason to doubt the libertarian’s capacity to take into account any 
form of autonomy (Cohen, 1995, pp. 210–213, 238–243), contrary to Robert Nozick’s 
well-known arguments that the two concepts are compatible within a libertarian 
framework (Nozick, 1974, pp. 28–33). This is because libertarians ground their 
arguments in Lockean arguments of natural rights and self-ownership (Locke, 1980 
[1698]) rather than Kantian arguments of respect for autonomy (Kant, 1998 [1785]). 
Michael Otsuka has convincingly argued that the former is in fact morally prior to the 
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latter for libertarians (Otsuka, 2005, pp. 1–6); thus libertarianism is poorly equipped to 
deal with claims regarding moral or personal autonomy. 
 
Yet it is not clear how much Thaler and Sunstein share these moral foundations, or 
whether nudges are bound to them. If self-ownership is the reason why Thaler and 
Sunstein want to preserve choices, it is not obvious. Even if it were, it matters little which 
is considered morally prior so long as principles of self-ownership and respect for 
autonomy result in compatible conclusions. I believe that they do. As discussed above, the 
decision-making situation can be designed to protect authentic choices so that it contains 
options that the individual would choose in a situation free from obstacles (either 
internal or external). If Thaler and Sunstein use nudges in order to ensure free choices 
and their value (Scanlon, 2000, pp. 251–256), then this is entirely compatible with the 
belief that an authentic will requires free choices to be authentic. An organisation 
attempting to promote self-empowerment, individual independence and self-fulfilment 
might therefore choose to employ nudging with the latter justification. So long as the 
method of nudging employed is not in tension with authenticity or competency (the 
grounds for autonomy), then it appears that nudging may be employed to promote self-
empowerment. 
 
Goodwin identifies two sources of this tension between the aim of a nudge and the 
method it employs to achieve its stated aim. The first relates to the impoverished 
conception of freedom. I hope to have shown that choice architecture need not be 
hopelessly bound to the traditional libertarian preference for negative liberty to which 
Goodwin objects. However, my argument in favour of nudging is incomplete if it merely 
shows that the justification for nudging may be compatible with self-empowerment. A 
second source of tension still requires a solution. If nudging is found to be paternalistic 
or manipulative, then the compatibility of its justification with the promotion of personal 
autonomy will be problematic, given that the implementation of a nudge will be at odds 
with its stated aim. If this is the case, nudging would be self-defeating in attempting to 
empower ordinary citizens. The proponent of nudging thus also needs to show that the 
process itself does not undermine personal autonomy. 
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3. Libertarianism and Paternalism 
 
I suspect that the tension between self-ownership and respect for autonomy identified in 
the previous section is the reason why (even after an explicit denial from Thaler and 
Sunstein (2003)) it is commonly thought that a combination of libertarianism and 
paternalism is at least unstable or contradictory (Wall, 2009), if not an outright 
oxymoron. This is because paternalism is commonly thought to be a problem arising from 
an intervention by one person to substitute the judgement of the other regarding their 
pursuit of their own good (Quong, 2011 pp. 73–83; Shiffrin, 2000). Thus the answer to 
Goodwin’s worry regarding paternalism is necessarily connected to his worry regarding 
empowerment. If nudging as a method of prompting choices undermines the autonomy 
of an individual (because it is paternalistic), then regardless of the reasons we employ to 
justify the nudge, the act itself will fail to be empowering. 
 
Part of the difficulty in answering this question is that there are a wide range of policies 
recommended under the umbrella of nudging, which forms a subsection of an even larger 
group of general behaviour-changing interventions. The best known survey of nudging 
and its impact on personal autonomy is provided by Daniel M. Hausman and BrynnWelch 
(2010), who argue that the forms of influence proposed by Thaler and Sunstein ‘are in 
many cases not paternalistic at all, but instead largely cases of rational persuasion’ 
(Hausman and Welch, 2010, p. 136). Rational persuasion and paternalistic interferences 
are opposed because they treat the authentic will (or the individual’s ability to decide 
true to themselves) in opposing fashions. Paternalistic interferences attempt to subvert 
or override the agent’s authentic will, making decisions regarding their own well-being 
for them. A classic example of a paternalistic act is the forced blood transfusion for a 
Jehovah’s Witness patient, as such acts are performed against the express consent of the 
patient for their own good. Clearly contrasted with such behaviour is rational persuasion. 
Such acts respect the rational will or status of the individual as an autonomous agent, 
supplying the individual with reasons why they should agree without attempting to 
distort the individual’s ability to decide authentically on the evidence provided. The 
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provision of additional information or appeals to emotion are simple examples of this 
form of interaction. These actions respect the personal autonomy of the individual and 
thus cannot be paternalistic. 
 
As a broad umbrella of interferences, nudges straddle this important boundary. Hausman 
and Welch argue that certain cases of nudging will be paternalistic because they ‘push 
people to make choices that are good for themselves by taking advantage of imperfections 
in human decision-making abilities’ (Hausman and Welch, 2010, p. 124). Such acts are 
problematic because they override or circumvent the autonomous agent’s rational 
decision-making capacities, thus failing to respect their status as an autonomous agent. 
This form of nudging will be a paternalistic form of manipulation and morally 
problematic, requiring a burden of justification on those who intend to employ them. As 
a way of example, it appears that framing effects may cause this form of concern. The 
thought here is simple: ‘choices depend, in part, on the way in which problems are stated’ 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 40). Framing effects function in part due to their covert 
nature. Consider the well-known example of the framing of the option of surgery. 
Explaining the option in terms of its success rate increases the acceptance of surgery 
when compared to explaining the option in terms of its mortality rate. Because of this 
covert nature, our ability to ensure that our decisions are authentic is undermined 
precisely because we are unsure to what extent our thoughts are affected by framing 
(Hanna, 2011). The unconscious nature of these influences raises the concern of 
paternalism. But not all forms of nudging do this. Some actively work to ensure that 
paternalism does not occur (e.g. those that function by prompting you to consider a wider 
set of information relevant to a problem), whereas others seem to be simply benign in 
this regard. Consider the ‘cool-down periods’ now commonly enforced on contracts. Thus 
I argue that Goodwin is too quick to reject such benign acts as morally problematic, at 
least on the grounds of paternalism. 
 
4. The Prospects for Social Transformation 
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Certain forms of nudging respect personal autonomy and escape Goodwin’s main 
concerns. They can be employed to empower individuals in line with their own plans and 
they do so without contravening the autonomous decision-making process. This does not 
apply to all forms of nudging, and to that extent Goodwin’s concerns are valid. But my 
response is aimed to show how and why his major claims do not apply to all forms of 
nudging. I have argued that nudges can be a valuable part of a government’s set of policies 
to ensure empowerment without being paternalistic. By protecting our capacity to 
choose and furthering the authenticity of our choices, nudging appears to be a valid 
candidate in the government’s drive for empowering citizens. 
 
Does this mean that we have no reason to be doubtful of nudging? I would like to conclude 
by arguing that we should accept a reason Goodwin provides in favour of rejecting 
nudges, that of nudging’s weak ability to be genuinely transformative. Goodwin asserts 
that ‘nudging is unable to deliver the kind of substantive changes that are needed to tackle 
the big problems that society faces’ (Goodwin, 2012, pp. 89–90). I think this is true but 
not for the reasons Goodwin posits. He argues that nudges overemphasise individual 
preferences and rely on an atomistic approach to social structure. Because of this, nudges 
will fail to move people to think and deliberate together, and act in concert to solve large-
scale problems. 
 
We may have reason to doubt Goodwin’s claim, given that Thaler and Sunstein repeatedly 
call for a publicity condition to be built in and for a drive for transparency to be pursued. 
Nudges are controversial enough to motivate people to discuss their benefits and costs. 
This is useful as it can inform a feedback loop, providing further information for their 
architects to rework nudges that are failing to bring about the desired outcome. But even 
if we should accept Goodwin’s claim, I argue that he has failed to identify the real problem. 
The true failure of nudging in this regard is that it is often so benign that it will fail to be 
genuinely transforming because it cannot establish original (or significantly alter 
existing) moral or social norms (Elster, 2007, pp. 104–107). Nudges can alter the 
behaviour of individuals to coincide with those who accept certain norms, but it cannot 
provide the reasons necessary to alter people’s behaviour in the long run. Thus, on their 
own, successful nudges merely lead people to act as if they accepted the norm, without 
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attempting to engage with the individual at that deeper level that Goodwin may have in 
mind. Further, nudging appears poorly equipped on its own to consider the complexities 
of social transformation and group dynamics required to tackle large-scale problems. The 
reproduction of norms is particularly troubling for the approach given that it has been 
criticised for potentially slowing social learning by reducing personal responsibility and 
the likelihood of error in citizens’ decision-making. If we are to reject nudging as an entire 
project for any reason, it might be that it is not particularly effective in the long run. 
 
However this seems like a poor reason to reject something entirely. Instead it seems like 
a reason to use some of its parts, some of the time in tandem with other insights on the 
interplay between moral and social rules (Gaus, 2011). As sociologist Elizabeth Shove 
highlights, government activity to alter behaviour suffers because it relies on a simplified 
analysis that misrepresents the complex picture of large social change. Shove contends 
that values may not be the drivers of individual behaviour that constitute norms but the 
resulting consequence of the social environment (Shove, 2010). Although analysis of 
individual action is contested (Bratman, 2007; Mele, 2003; Raz, 1978) and subject to 
ongoing debate, the call for a more nuanced and holistic understanding is likely to be 
beneficial. Indeed this was the conclusion of the 2001 House of Lords report into 
behaviour change (HOL STSC, 2011, pp. 33–34) which expresses doubts regarding the 
effectiveness of non-regulatory measures on their own. 
 
This point is important for assessing the current government position on large-scale 
societal problems such as gambling (DCMS, 2001), sustainability (DEFRA, 2008), 
infrastructure policy (DfT, 2007) and health (DH, 2004), and suggesting further 
opportunities for progressive state intervention. Consider health care and the difficult 
subject of organ donation. The change from opt-in to opt-out systems has long been 
considered an effective method of increasing organ donor numbers but has been the 
subject of a long-running ethical debate (Saunders, 2012). The role nudging can play on 
its own is, however, debatable (ODT, 2008). Given that changing public behaviour 
towards organ donation to increase donor numbers is a current strategic objective of the 
Organ Donation Taskforce (NHS, 2012, p. 11), it seems advisable that a broad range of 
policy methods should be employed. Indeed this is also the conclusion of the Behavioural 
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Insights Team (Cabinet Office, 2010, pp. 10–11). It appears that nudges have some valid 
role to play in solving large-scale issues but only in tandem with other policy options. 
Thus it seems misguided to reject something potentially useful on these grounds. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this short response piece I have not had the space to engage with some of Goodwin’s 
other claims. Specifically I have not commented on his belief in the superiority of 
deliberative democracy, which I agree may constitute a reason to prefer it over nudging. 
But deliberative democracy is far harder to implement than a policy of nudges and what 
is more, they need not be mutually exclusive. Where Goodwin and I are in complete 
agreement is that wider, more in-depth treatment (Rebanato, 2012) of these issues would 
be beneficial to policymakers and political theorists alike. It is hoped that this response 
helps begin this process. 
 
Word Count: 3,723. 
 
  
12 
 
Bibliography 
Berlin, I. (1969), Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bratman, M. (2007), Structures of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cabinet Office (2010), Applying Behavioural Insight to Health, London: Cabinet Office. 
Christman, J. and Anderson, J. (2005), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cohen, G. (1995), Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Colburn, B. (2010), Autonomy and Liberalism, New York: Routledge. 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) (2001), Gambling Review Report, 
London: Stationery Office. 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2008), A Framework for 
Pro-environmental Behaviours, London: DEFRA. 
Department of Health (DH) (2004), Choosing Health: Making Healthy Choices Easier, 
London: Stationery Office. 
Department for Transport (DfT) (2007), Manual for Streets, London: Thomas Telford 
Publishing. 
Dworkin, G. (1988), The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Elster, J. (2007), Explaining Social Behaviour: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gaus, G.F. (2011), The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a 
Diverse and Bounded World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goodwin, T. (2012), ‘Why We Should Reject “Nudge” ’, Politics 32(2), pp. 85–92. 
Hanna, J. (2011), ‘Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects’, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 14(5), pp. 517–531. 
Hausman, D.M. and Welch, B. (2010), ‘To Nudge or Not to Nudge’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy 18(1), pp. 123–136. 
House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee (HOL STSC) (2011), Behaviour 
Change, London: Stationery Office. 
Hurka, T. (1987), ‘Why Value Autonomy?’, Social Theory and Practice 13(3), pp. 361–382. 
Kant, I. (1998 [1785]), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. M. Gregor. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Locke, J. (1980 [1698]), Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson, Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett. 
Mele, A. (2003), Motivation and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
National Health Service (NHS) (2012), Blood and Transplant Strategic Plan 2012–17, 
London: Department of Health. 
Nozick, R. (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Organ Donation Taskforce (ODT) (2008), The Potential Impact of an Opt Out System for 
Organ Donation in the UK, London: Department of Health. 
Otsuka, M. (2005), Libertarianism without Inequality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Quong, J. (2011), Liberalism without Perfection, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Raz, J. (1978), Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Raz, J. (1986), The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Rebanato, R. (2012), Taking Liberties: A Critical Examination of Libertarian Paternalism, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Saunders, B. (2012), ‘Opt-Out Organ Donation without Presumptions’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 38, pp. 69–72. 
13 
 
Scanlon, T.M. (2000), What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Shiffrin, S.V. (2000), ‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine and Accommodation’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 29(3), pp. 205–250. 
Shove, E. (2010), ‘Beyond ABC: Climate Change Policy and Theories of Social Change’, 
Environment and Planning A 42, pp. 1273–1285. 
Swift, A. (2006), Political Philosophy: A Beginner’s Guide for Students and Politicians (2nd 
edn), Cambridge: Polity. 
Taylor, J.S. (2005), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in 
Contemporary Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C.R. (2003), ‘Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron’, 
University of Chicago Law Review 70(4), pp. 1159–1202. 
Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008), Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and 
Happiness, London: Penguin. 
Wall, S. (1998), Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wall, S. (2009), ‘Self-Ownership and Paternalism’, Journal of Political Philosophy 17(4), 
pp. 399–417. 
